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EUROPEAN UNION’S ENERGY DIPLOMACY  
IN THE WIDER BLACK SEA REGION 
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Abstract. The present paper discusses the strategic importance that the Caspian Basin 
hydrocarbons (especially natural gas) have to the EU’s energy security, against the background of 
EU’s increasing dependence on gas imports from the Russian Federation. The political engagement of 
various political actors of the EU (the European Commission, but also Member States and 
international energy majors) is analyzed with respect to the advancement of the competing transport 
projects transiting the Wider Black Sea Region. While discussing the dimensions of EU’s energy 
policy, the paper focuses on the energy security contribution that the Southern Gas Corridor is expected 
to make, as well as on the systemic constraints and opportunities brought by Brussels’ new energy policy 
initiatives. Special attention is given to the recent articulation of a unitary and coherent energy 
diplomacy approach by the European Commission, and the proposal of a major investment plan in 
energy infrastructure. However, the paper argues that too little, too late may have been undertaken in 
order to turn EU’s Southern Corridor into a robust and credible diversification alternative to the 
Russian-owned or controlled gas transport lines. 
 
Keywords: Energy security, energy diplomacy, energy geopolitics, Wider Black Sea Region, 
EU energy policies, Southern Gas Corridor, Nord Stream, South Stream, Nabucco 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On September 7, 2011, the European Commission (EC) released a 
communication called “On security of energy supply and international 
cooperation – The EU energy policy: engaging with partners beyond our 
borders” (EC, 2011a). This was a remarkable document, marking a strategic 
shift in the EU’s energy policies: for the first time, the EC presented an 
integrated and coherent concept of common energy policy, meant to articulate 
                                                          
* PhD Candidate, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest, 
Romania, radududau@gmail.com, beneficiary of the ”Doctoral Scholarships for a 
Sustainable Society”, project co-financed by the European Union through the 
European Social Fund, Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources and 
Development 2007-2013. 
Radu DUDĂU, Leonela LENES 
 
84 
 
a single voice in dealing with Europe’s primary energy providers. Indeed, such a 
foreign policy action in pursuit of EU’s overall energy security can aptly be 
described as energy diplomacy. Now, the meaning of energy security is inherently 
perspective-dependent: while the buyer’s perspective focuses on energy 
availability in sufficient quantities, at affordable prices, and through secure and 
diversified infrastructure, the seller looks at market shares and control of the 
transport routes. As shall be seen below, such a perspective difference is not 
easily conducive to cooperation between the two sides. 
In order to appreciate the novelty and relevance of EC’s mentioned 
step, it suffices to recollect the pervasive lament about the apparent disunity in 
the responses of various Member States to the “gas crises” of 2006 and 2009 
between Russia and the Ukraine. The “bilateral deals” that major energy 
companies from Western Europe, with solid support from their governments, 
made with Gazprom (the main gas provider to Europe by far), thus 
undermining Europe’s solidarity in energy matters, were a tenor of policy 
analysis and public rhetoric, especially in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 
 First, some relevant facts: the EU imports most of its primary             
energy – over 80 percent of oil and over 60 percent of natural gas. Natural gas 
is increasingly important in the overall European energy mix, especially in the 
light of Brussels’ ambitious goals of greenhouse gas reduction, and the assumed 
renunciation of nuclear energy in Germany by 2022. In 2008, 55 percent of 
EU’s gas imports came from the Russian Federation, mostly through the 
Ukraine (Mitrova, 2008; Eurostat, 2008). Yet, of the EU-27 Member States, the 
CEE countries depend to a much greater extent on Russian imports. Not only 
do they import almost their entire gas supplies from Russia,1 but they are also 
poorly connected to Europe’s gas infrastructure. Also, the EU Member States 
of the Wider Black Sea Region2 have geographic limitations hindering their 
ability to tap into the international trade with liquefied natural gas (LNG), 
mainly because the tanker traffic through the Black Sea straits is already being 
virtually congested.  
 There is a structural difference between Western Europe’s ability to 
ensure its natural gas supplies (thanks to various pipeline providers apart from 
Russia, easy access to LNG supplies, and rich transport and storage 
infrastructure) and the Eastern European quasi-complete dependence on 
Russian export. As shown by Mitrova (2008: 7), while the UK, the Netherlands 
or Belgium depend on Gazprom’s deliveries for less than 10 percent of their 
needs, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Greece import over 80 percent of their gas from 
                                                          
1 Romania is a notable exception. It buys from Gazprom about one quarter of its gas 
needs – see, among others, BP (2011: 22).  
2 The Wider Black Sea Region (WBSR) refers conventionally to the six riparian states, 
plus Azerbaijan, Greece, and Moldova. 
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Russia, with several other EU member states’ dependence exceeding 60 
percent. In Germany, which is the main Russian gas importer (approaching 40 
billion cubic meters per annum – bcma- as of 2011), Gazprom’s market share is 
almost 40 percent (BP, 2011). However, Berlin’s energy relations to Moscow 
can be confidently described as “complex interdependence”, to use Keohane 
and Nye’s (1977/2000) celebrated phrase; that is to say, unlike the CEE 
Member States, thanks to its market size and ability to diversify its supplies, 
Germany’s – but also France’s and Italy’s, to varying degrees and for different 
reasons – dependence on Gazprom is essentially of a symmetric type.  
Accordingly, the notion of “energy security” rings differently in the 
CEE, emphasizing the diversification of supply sources and import routes. 
Indeed, the intra-European cleavage of perceptions in energy security policies 
has been widened by the November 8 inauguration of the Nord Stream 
pipeline’s first leg, but also by Germany’s May 2011 political decision to 
speedily decommission its nuclear energy plants. These steps are likely to have 
ample effects upon the continental energy security arrangements, and to exert 
considerable pressure on the already vulnerable Member States of CEE. As 
indicated by Nye, “manipulating the asymmetries of interdependence can be a 
source of power in international politics” (Nye, 2005: 202). 
It is against this background that the mentioned communication of the 
CE appears to be particularly salient. 
 
 
2. EC’s energy policies 
 
As pointed out by Kirchner and Berk (2010: 869), the EU-level 
measures toward a common energy policy go back a long way; thus, “one of the 
Euratom provisions stipulates that Member States cannot buy more than 20 
percent of their uranium from a single non-EU supplier.” But then, in the 
aftermath of 1973’s oil shock, instead of forging a common external energy 
policy, the Member States turned to individual approaches – as we shall see in 
the next section. 
More recently, the EC addressed the issue of EU’s external energy 
security in its 2008 Second Strategic Energy Review, titled “An EU Energy Security 
and Solidarity Action Plan”. That document, approved by the European 
Parliament in March 2009, lays out a strategic plan focusing on energy 
infrastructure development and supplies diversification, on building 
hydrocarbon stocks, and increasing energy efficiency. For natural gas, the 
security of supply injunction translates into the goal of achieving a level of 
diversification away from Russian sources and pipelines. For its Black Sea 
vicinity, the EC has prioritized the creation of the so-called Southern Gas Corridor 
“for the supply of gas from Caspian and Middle Eastern sources” (EC,            
Radu DUDĂU, Leonela LENES 
 
86 
 
2008b: 5). We discuss in more detail the development of the Southern Corridor 
in the next section. 
 A second component of EU’s energy policies is about the internal 
energy markets of electricity and natural gas, which ought to be turned, 
respectively, into unified and fully liberalized utility markets. The latest 
regulatory steps in this respect are outlined in the Third Energy Market Package 
(TEP) – proposed by the CE in September 2007, approved by the European 
Parliament in September 2009, and due to have been implemented into national 
legislation by the Member States by March 3, 2011. Nevertheless, so far no 
Member State has completed this step. TEP consists in two Directives on the 
electricity and gas markets, respectively (2009/72/EC and 2009/73/ EC) and 
three Regulations regarding the access conditions to the gas transmission 
networks, the network for cross-border electricity exchanges, and the creation 
of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). Because it 
turned out that a block in the way of more substantive market liberalization was 
the exclusive control that major energy producers exerted upon the transport 
networks, precluding competitors from market access, TEP has been aimed at 
“ownership unbundling,” that is at dismantling the vertically integrated 
companies by separating transmission from supply activities. More specifically, 
TEP envisages to reach (a) the independence of the transport system operators 
(TSOs) from the control of particular energy producers; (b) non-discriminatory 
access for “Third Parties” to the retail distributions both in the electricity and 
gas sectors; (c) the autonomy of the national energy regulators, with 
management and finances outside the political control; and (d) adequate social 
protection, without distortions of market competitiveness (Dudău and 
Simionel, 2011: 70).  
A third major component of EU’s energy policies is the Climate and 
Energy Package, issued in January 2008 (EC, 2008a), which launched the         
“20-20-20” slogan: a reduction of EU’s greenhouse gas emissions of at least 
20% compared to the 1990 levels, a commitment to a target of 20% of the EU 
energy consumption to come from renewable resources, and a 20% reduction 
in primary energy use by improving energy efficiency. The goals have been 
reiterated in the ambitious Europe 2020 growth strategy of 2010 (EC, 2010). In 
practice, these measures against global warming give special weight to natural 
gas consumption within EU’s energy mix, since gas is the “cleanest” of all 
hydrocarbons.  
The Treaty of Lisbon is emphatic about the “spirit of solidarity” 
between Member States with regard to energy matters. Indeed, Article 175A 
enjoins the EU to “(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure 
security of energy supply in the Union; (c) promote energy efficiency and 
energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy: and 
(d) promote the interconnection of energy networks.” (Official Journal of the EU, 
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2007/C 306/01). However, for several historical, economy-structural and 
geographic factors, the above delineated energy policies have largely remained 
mere desiderata. Let us analyse those factors in turn. 
 
 
3. The Member States’ national energy security strategies 
 
 As hinted upon, the Member States have individually developed their 
own energy sectors by following different strategies. After the OPEC oil 
embargo of the 1970s, they chose to rely on different energy mixes, provided 
for from different sources. Some (France, Belgium) chose nuclear energy, some 
diversified suppliers from OPEC to non-OPEC, and some (for example, the 
UK and the Netherlands) invested in the production of indigenous energy 
resources (North Sea oil and gas) (Kirchner and Berk, 2010: 869). 
Meanwhile, Austria, Germany and Italy resorted to natural gas imports 
from the Soviet Union. In fact, a handful of European large energy firms have a 
decade-long experience of cooperation with Gazprom, since the latter was still 
the Soviet Ministry of Natural Gas. As pointed out by Rawi Abdelal, “the 
Germans and Italians have the longest-standing relationships. Eni and 
Gazprom concluded their first contract in 1969. The first Rurhgas-Gazprom 
contract dates to 1973, and Burckhard Bergmann, the CEO of Ruhrgas 
between 2001 and 2008, has served on Gazprom’s board of directors since 
2000. Wintershall and Gazprom established their first of several joint ventures 
in 1993 with the creation of WINGAS, with the German firm owning fifty 
percent plus one share. For these firms, Russia is not a threat, but a                    
long-standing partner” (Abdelal, 2011: 29). 
But North Sea oil and gas production peaked, for most fields, by the 
early 1990s. Meanwhile, Mitteleuropa and the eastern part of the continent grew 
increasingly dependent on Russian gas, as their domestic hydrocarbons 
production continued to decrease. This, again, has had a differential effect upon 
the energy markets of the CEE Member States, on the one hand, and those of 
Germany, France and Italy, on the other hand. The latter have felt protected 
from the threat of over-dependency by the sheer size of their markets. 
Accordingly, those countries’ governments have chosen to protect their own 
national energy champions, engaged in long-term contracts with Gazprom. The 
outlook of these companies has been shaped by their own lucrative experience 
with Gazprom. Confident that Russia depends on Europe at least as much as 
Europe depends on Russia, those CEOs, along with many political decision-
makers in their states, view the overall energy relation with Gazprom as 
beneficial and mostly predictable, based on commercial interests. Among 
others, they tend to see as a liability Russia’s dependence Ukraine’s pipelines 
system, and are inclined to look favorably at any commercially viable transport 
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project promising to simplify and stabilize their relations with the Russian 
monopolistic gas exporter.  
In 2005, Gazprom formed the Nord Stream consortium with BASF’s 
Wintershall and E.ON’s Ruhrgas; later on N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie and GDF 
Suez also joined. The construction of the offshore 55 bcma Nord Stream 
pipeline began in April 2010 and its first leg linking Russia’s Vyborg to 
Germany’s Greifswald was finished in the summer of 2011 (www.nord-
stream.com/pipeline, 2011). The official inauguration took place on November 
8, 2011 (EurActiv, 2011). The total cost has already exceeded €7 billion, with 
Gazprom set to invest an additional €1.3 billion in the onshore section (Smith, 
2011: 121)3.  
Then, for Russia’s southern flank, Gazprom and ENI formed in 2008 
the South Stream consortium, intent on constructing an offshore pipeline 
underneath the Black Sea, from Russia to Bulgaria, and to ship gas further into 
Southern and Central Europe. Both Nord Stream and South Stream were 
conceived essentially as means of “dis-intermediating” the transit                   
states – Ukraine in the first place, but also Poland and the Baltics. The 
diplomatic protests from the latter countries came out loud and clear: In 2006, 
Radoslaw Sikorski, back then Polish defense minister, graphically labeled Nord 
Stream the “Molotov-Ribbentrop pipeline.” Sikorski’s hyperbolic utterance 
certainly translates a pervasive and acute concern in the CEE that Russia may 
use Gazprom’s monopolistic position as a foreign policy tool of coercion upon 
its closer and more vulnerable neighbors. In fact, a strategy along those precise 
lines was articulated by Vladimir Putin already in his 1997 doctoral dissertation 
at St Petersburg’s Mining Institute, “The Strategic Planning of Regional 
Resources”, in which Russia’s strongman articulated his views about the role of 
energy in the reconstruction of the Russian state and its international place 
(Stuermer, 2008: 44). Russia’s Energy Strategy until 2020 also explicitly assumes 
the purpose of converting energy trade into foreign policy influence. In 
practice, Moscow’s relationship with Belarus has evolved along this line, with 
Ukraine appearing to follow suit. Over the past few years, Moldova, Georgia 
and Lithuania had to come to terms with Gazprom’s turning off the oil and gas 
                                                          
3 Nord Stream is to be linked through two pipelines to the Central European network. 
The first one, OPAL (Ostsee-Pipeline-Anbindungs-Leitung), which is already under 
construction, will extend 470 km to link Nord Stream to JAGAL, the German segment 
of the Yamal pipeline. The second one, NEL (Norddeutsche Erdgasleitung) is planned to 
link Nord Stream to STEGAL, at the Czech border, through MIDAL                            
(Mitte-Deutschland Anbindungsleitung). The two interconnectors belong to Wingas (the 
Wintershall-Gazprom joint venture) and are due to come on-stream in 2011. These 
facts support our conjecture that European energy security is largely driven from West 
to East by the business interests of European energy majors, in partnership with 
Gazprom.  
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spigot. Hence, the apparently squeamish East Europeans have some worrisome 
instances to draw upon in feeding their perceptions of Russia’s international 
reassertion.  
We shall have more to say about South Stream’s role and implications in 
subsection 4.2, focused on the pipelines politics of the Black Sea region. Until 
then, let us refer to another factor of imbalance in Europe’s energy policies: the 
mentioned German decommissioning of nuclear energy. Decided upon hastily, 
in the wake of the March 2011 Fukushima disaster, the ongoing Energiewende has 
in fact built upon a popular wave of green politics in Germany. However, its 
environmental goals have generated unintended effects: the insatiable German 
need for energy led to increased consumption of fossil fuel-generated power. A 
federally subsidized program for gas and coal power plants has been put up, 
financed from the governmental Green Fond (Drieschner, 2011). In this 
context, Gazprom and RWE closed a deal for the construction of new 
conventional power plants in Germany. It has been argued that this partnership 
did in fact deal a deadly blow to the EU’s flagship project of the Southern 
Corridor, Nabucco (Brueggmann, 2011; Petroleum Economist, 2011); we shall look 
into it in more detail in the next section. Also, the Czech company CEZ plans 
the construction of a new coal plant in Sachsen-Anhalt (Wiesmann, Belton, 
2011). Ironically, by taking this path, Germany becomes less able to keep its 
ambitious 2020 greenhouse gas reduction goals. Furthermore, with Nord 
Stream’s recent inauguration, the road for further massive imports of Russian 
gas is open. 
Apart from deepening the German economy’s dependence on 
Gazprom, Nord Stream is consequential in more than one way for the overall 
energy balance in Europe. For one thing, Germany’s growing consumption of 
natural gas is likely to funnel the bulk of Russia’s exports towards it, to the 
effect of raising Moscow’s leverage upon the smaller gas importers of the CEE. 
Those states are small markets for the Russian gas, and also relatively poorly 
interconnected with Northern and Western Europe’s gas grids. The increased 
West-European demand will allow Moscow to keep raising the gas prices, for 
Gazprom is already struggling to keep a steady level of production: According 
to the World Bank’s 2010 Energy Outlook for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, “just to maintain gas production levels, Gazprom would need to invest 
about $15 billion a year; to meet potential increases in demand, capital 
investment would have to increase to $20 billion a year” (World Bank,              
2010: xx). Under these circumstances, with the “market price” for natural gas in 
fact imposed by Gazprom’s through long-term contracts, most CEE states tend 
to see a risk of being squeezed (financially and in terms of energy access) 
between Western Europe and Russia (World Bank, 2010: 7-8). 
The Lisbon Treaty does leave Member States the unquestionable right 
to build up their own energy mix. However, as rightly pointed out by David 
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Buchan “Germany’s nuclear decision in May 2011 shows that this treaty right 
should be modified to state that a member state should consult at least on the 
timing and pace of any change in its energy mix affecting its EU partners. Such 
a modification, on its own, would not justify a treaty revision” (Buchan,          
2011: 5).  
Finally, the Third Energy Package (TEP) has brought uneasiness and 
discontent among national governments and some major energy companies all 
over the EU. Some Member States, such as France, have a tradition of 
monopoly and vertical integration. As German and Italian large energy 
companies are bound in time-tested lucrative deals with Gazprom, the latter’s 
business model runs against TEP’s grain. Then, in the CEE, a mix of 
disappointment and concern about that perceived “lack of solidarity” EU-wide 
in energy issues has bolstered a breed of self-centered, uncoordinated planning. 
In particular, TEP is seen as either useful or detrimental, depending on the 
circumstances of specific deals. For illustration, Poland’s recent option for 
import more Russian gas confronted Warsaw with a problematic side of TEP: 
the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline, on which the imports depend, is a $15.6 billion 
investment that has Gazprom operated and partly owned in Poland, through 
EuRoPol Gaz. The deal needed an exemption from TEP’s unbundling 
requirements, and the ensuing give-and-take between Warsaw and Brussels, 
which ended in a compromise, led to warnings from the EC about an 
infringement case against Poland. On the other hand, Lithuania has used TEP 
as an instrument in trying to diminish Gazprom’s leverage upon the Lithuanian 
gas system. Gazprom owns 37.1 percent of the country’s main gas company, 
Lietuvos Dujos, while E.ON Ruhrgas has 38.9 percent. Vilnius decided to 
separate gas supply from transport assets, invoking European legislation. 
Expectedly, Gazprom has protested vigorously, calling Lithuania’s action an 
“effective nationalization”. 
It should be clear that the three dimensions of EU’s energy policy are 
systemically inter-related, and that coherent energy planning, domestically and 
at EU level, is of the essence. 
 
 
 4. Energy politics in the Wider Black Sea Region 
 
1.1 The Southern Corridor projects 
 
The aftermath of the Cold War set the conditions for a competitive 
“game” of pipeline projects, with heavy geopolitical stakes. The Wider Black 
Sea Region states have seen their geography enhanced to a strategic level due to 
new hydrocarbons discoveries in the Caspian Basin, in the early 1990s, and the 
efforts of delivering those resources to the Western markets. Indeed, the states 
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along the road – Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania – have considered 
both the opportunity of acquiring new oil and gas supplies, as well as the 
political and economic benefits of being transited by flows of hydrocarbons.  
With Western political, technical, and financial support, two major  
non-Russian pipelines were completed in 2005 and 2006, respectively: the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, transporting Azerbaijani oil to the 
Mediterranean port of Ceyhan (Turkey); and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas 
pipeline (better known as the South Caucasus Pipeline) running parallel to the 
former up to Erzurum, in eastern Anatolia. Thus, the idea of a major pipeline 
to ship natural gas from the Caspian Basin to Central Europe came naturally: 
Nabucco was born as a concept in 2002 and took almost a decade to develop 
until its technical, legal, and financial niceties have been laid out. Nonetheless, 
as shall be seen below, if anything, the odds that it will be implemented have 
recently dwindled.  
Nabucco is currently planned to start being constructed in 2013 from 
the Georgian-Turkish border (www.nabucco-pipeline.com, 2011), and to 
transport Caspian gas westwards through Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and 
Austria, till the terminus hub, close to Vienna. The line’s total length is put to 
3,900 km. The first gas is expected to flow in 2017, just when Azerbaijan’s Shah 
Deniz offshore gas field is expected to reach full development and supply an 
added 10 bcma. The pipeline is planned to reach a maximum output of 31 
bcma by 2018. The initial cost estimate was €7.9 billion – though the 
consortium admits the final costs may be raised due to a rerouting of feeder 
lines from Northern Iraq and to the rising cost of steel (Andre, 2011). The 
shareholders are OMV (Austria), MOL (Hungary), BEH (Bulgaria), Transgaz 
(Romania), Botas (Turkey), and RWE (Germany) – all with equal parts.  
After years of inactivity, it was really the Russo-Ukrainian gas spat of 
January 2009 that triggered a more substantive level of political interest in 
Nabucco. An intergovernmental agreement was signed in Ankara in July 2009. 
As the flagship project of the Southern Corridor, Nabucco has enjoyed a sound 
level of support from the EC. Nonetheless, it has been looked at with no 
enthusiasm by the main energy states of Western Europe. The point has been 
well made by Katinka Barysch: “Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, has 
been lukewarm about Nabucco and initially vetoed the EU’s €200 million grant 
[for the initial feasibility study] to the pipeline (officially because she did not 
want EU stimulus money to be spent outside the EU). She later spoke out in 
favor of Nabucco, but only after the EU reconfirmed its support for the 
German-Russian led Nord Stream – despite visceral opposition from Poland 
and other member-states. Neither has Nicolas Sarkozy been a champion of the 
Southern Corridor. The Turks … had rebuffed Gas de France’s offer to join 
the Nabucco consortium. Sarkozy now seems to prefer that France’s big energy 
company join forces with Gazprom: Gas de France joined the Nord Stream 
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project in March 2010 while Electricité de France is rumored to be talking 
about participation in [Gazprom’s] South Stream. …Silvio Berlusconi also 
prioritizes bilateral relations with Russia. Italy’s ENI is Gazprom’s main partner 
in South Stream. That leaves the UK as the strongest backer of Nabucco 
among the big Member States” (Barysch, 2010: 3).  
 Indeed, the initial lukewarm commitment largely explains why a project 
making political and economic sense has suffered so many delays. Yet after 
several years of sluggish progress, a number of steps of increasing significance 
started to be made by early 2011. A breakthrough for the Southern Gas 
Corridor was the joint declaration signed in Baku on January 13, 2011 by 
President Ilham Alyiev and EC President José Manuel Barroso, through which 
Azerbaijan commits to opening-up the Corridor with sufficient gas supplies 
(Hall and Roberts, 2011: 5). The next day, Turkmenistan’s president declared 
his country’s readiness to “collaborate with our counterparts from the EU”. 
Turkmenistan took a subsequent step forward with Ashgabat’s March 1 
international conference on the “Environmental Aspects of Trans-Caspian 
Pipelines.” As noticed by Socor (2011a), “the government initiated the 
conference to advance a detailed ecological case in favor of laying a gas pipeline 
on the seabed to Azerbaijan.”  
Nonetheless, a real difference in terms of EU commitment to the 
Southern Corridor came as recently as September 7, 2011, with the mentioned 
EC Communication setting the ground for unified energy diplomacy of the EU 
Member States. A practical follow-up of that strategic document came on 
September 12, when the EC mandated the facilitation of negotiations between 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to speed up the construction of a trans-Caspian 
gas pipeline.  
Further, on October 19, the EC President announced a major 
infrastructure investment plan called “Connecting Europe,” envisaging the 
allocation of €50 billion from the EU’s 2014-2020 budget for transport, energy, 
and communications infrastructure. Out of that, €9.1 billion is to be invested in 
energy transport infrastructure and climate protection measures (EurActiv, 
2011a). The strategic proposal is to define and approve “projects of common 
interest,” speed up their approval procedures and secure the necessary funding. 
For the latter purpose, the “Connecting Europe” plan will be backed by the 
“Project Bond Initiative,” designed to act “as a catalyst to re-open the debt 
capital market (currently largely unexploited for infrastructure investments 
following the financial crisis) as a significant source of financing in the 
infrastructure sector” (EC, 2011). EU budget funds, combined with European 
Investment Bank financing, are expected to “reduce the risk for third party 
investors” (and thus mobilize additional “long-term private sector debt 
financing”). The €9.1 billion amount, although only a small part of the 
estimated €210 billion needed for Europe’s energy infrastructure until 2020, is 
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several orders of magnitude higher than the amounts previously made available 
through the so-called Trans-European Networks-Energy (TEN-E) program. 
Notably, the Southern Gas Corridor is one of the ‘Energy Infrastructure 
Priorities’ identified in that strategic plan. Thus, Nabucco received a morale 
boost in addition to the financial one (Dudău and Gușilov, 2011: 71). 
In order to better understand the significance of these commitments, 
one ought to ponder the main ground of skepticism about Nabucco: its 
apparent lack of gas supplies. Azerbaijan is the main candidate for opening-up 
the pipeline. Turkmenistan, with its huge reserves, comes next in line; 
Kazakhstan would likely also sign up to the endeavor once a Trans-Caspian 
connection was in place – and Russia vehemently opposes one. Iran, Iraq, and 
even Egypt and Qatar are also listed as possible suppliers. All in all, however, 
due to its geographic position, Azerbaijan is by far the most important potential 
source. The first stage of its offshore Shah Deniz field has been delivering since 
2007 about 7 bcma to Turkey. The Southern Corridor counts on production 
from the fields’ full development (also known as Shah Deniz 2), envisaged to 
be on-stream by 2017. As we shall see below, October 1, 2011 was the bidding 
deadline for the extra 10 bcma expected to be made available from Shah Deniz 
2. Apart from Nabucco, other contenders made their bids.  
Some analysts argue that an alternative more affordable than Nabucco 
is to “build incremental elements of infrastructure that add to existing capacity, 
thereby providing new or expanded linkages between customers and suppliers. 
These are typically pipeline interconnectors between existing networks and 
LNG terminals” (Oxford Analytica, 2010). Fact is that 7 bcma of gas from 
Azerbaijan have been reaching Greece since 2007, through the Turkey-Greece 
gas pipeline. The line was built by a joint venture of Turkey’s Botas and 
Greece’s Depa gas companies, across the Marmara Sea. Capitalizing on this 
line, the ITGI (Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector) project endeavors to reach 
Italy, extending from Komotini to the Thesprotia western coast of Greece and 
further to Otranto through a 217 km-long offshore interconnector across the 
Ionian Sea – a joint venture of Italy’s Edison SpA and Depa. The conduit is 
due to deliver 8 bcma by 2017, at a cost of €1.1 billion.  
Another “interconnector” is the Swiss-Norwegian-German TAP 
(Trans-Adriatic Pipeline) joint venture planned to transport 10 bcma of gas (to 
be doubled in a second phase) from Turkey to Italy through Greece and 
Albania, underneath the Adriatic Sea. It is also expected to be completed in 
2017, at a cost of €1.8 billion. ITGI and TAP compete with each other – and 
both of them with Nabucco – for Shah Deniz 2’s production. Both of them are 
included in the EU’s Southern Corridor. 
Importantly, though, the two interconnectors, as strictly commercial 
enterprises lack strategic significance in any politically substantive relevant to 
Europe’s energy security: ITGI and TAP would ship relatively minor volumes 
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to the “Italian gas market, which is already saturated with supplies from well-
diversified sources” (Socor, 2011a). Nabucco, on the other hand, has strategic 
value to Europe’s energy security, and especially for the CEE countries, already 
deeply dependent on Russian imports.  
Still, other contenders kept coming out competing for exactly those 
limited volumes of Azerbaijani gas. In September 2009, Presidents Alyev and 
Băsescu discussed in Bucharest the possibility of developing an LNG system 
for the export of Azerbaijani gas via the Black Sea. Dubbed AGRI                     
(Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector), the project envisions piping 
between 2 and 7 bcma of gas from Baku’s Sangachal terminal to the Georgian 
port of Kulevi, liquefying and then shipping it with LNG takers to Romania’s 
port of Constanta. On February 12, 2011, the ministers of energies of 
Azerbaijan, Georgian and Romania, joined by the Hungarian one, signed in 
Bucharest a resolution through which Hungary’s state-owned power holding 
MVM joined the venture4. Hungary’s participation in the project was made 
possible after the opening of the Arad-Szeged gas interconnector, at the end of 
2010.  
Now, the commercial and political chances of a small scale LNG system 
confined to the Black Sea do not look to well. AGRI has against itself a host of 
important factors: the high cost of the needed LNG facilities; the Turkish 
antipathy toward any Caspian gas project that would circumvent its             
territory – which would likely translate in Turkish stranglehold of LNG tanker 
traffic through the Straits; dependence on the fragile Georgian corridor, absent 
Western involvement in the project; and an obviously cold shoulder from the 
EC. On the other hand, if AGRI is to stand any serious chance, then it is 
pending on the progress of its onshore competitors for the Shah Deniz 2 gas.  
By October 1, 2011, the three contenders for the Shah Deniz 2 
production made their formal bids in a tender organized by SOCAR (State Oil 
Company of the Azerbaijan Republic) for the selection of its preferred gas link 
to Europe. The decision is due to fall in the coming months. Nonetheless, as if 
to make the Caspian gas contest all the more confusing, British Petroleum (BP) 
has made its own bid for Shah Deniz’s gas. Importantly, BP also operates Shah 
Deniz and has a 25.5 percent stake in it.  
The name of BP’s surprising proposal is South East Europe Pipeline 
(SEEP). SEEP’s concept is rather to upgrade existent infrastructure, more or 
less following in Nabucco’s proposed track. More precisely, the line “would use 
existing pipelines and interconnectors for about two thirds of the 3,800 
kilometer route from Central Anatolia to Central Europe. In would require 
laying some 1,300 kilometers of new pipelines on several portions of that 
                                                          
4 The four companies (Romgaz, Socar, GOGC and MVM) will each hold 25 percent of 
the shares. 
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route” (Socor, 2011c). This move certainly complicates the politics of the 
Southern Corridor, leaning the odds against Nabucco. Like ITGI and TAP, 
SEEP is “nonstrategic” in nature, that is, it has merely a commercial dimension. 
As such, it cannot make a sizeable contribution to EU’s energy security, since 
the market forces alone are unlikely to overcome the Russian resistance against 
a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. But then there may be more to it than meets the 
eye. Here is a telling quote from Mathew Hulbert (2011): “In tabling the SEE 
Pipeline, BP may have decided to have a bilateral discussion with Moscow. BP 
knows how important South Stream is to Moscow’s structural designs over 
European gas – just as much as Moscow knows how crucial an upstream Arctic 
stake is for BP. So business can be done”.  
 This, of course, is only a supposition, though a plausible one. But we 
can also find other hints about BP’s strategic take of the issue. In February this 
year, BP released a cost assessment for Nabucco, almost doubling its estimate 
from €7.9 billion (the consortium’s own initial estimate) to €14 billion, mostly 
based on “soaring commodity prices” (especially iron ore). But the British 
energy major did not pay equal attention to the cost estimates for Nabucco’s 
competitors, although those would also be affected by rising commodity prices. 
True, because they would be shorter, ITGI and TAP would be less affected by 
the increasing steel price; and also true, as they are both planned to start 
operating at full capacities (unlike Nabucco’s initial one third of the full 
volume), the increase would be less painfully felt. Yet, the cost of upgrading the 
existing Turkish gas grid, on which the two interconnectors count, is likely to 
be higher than admitted. Also, while Nabucco already rests on an international 
treaty among the transit states, the juridical regime of the interconnectors’ use 
of the Turkish pipelines remains to be sorted out.  
 In any event, SEEP’s last minute arrival complicates Nabucco’s 
outlook. The fact that Shah Deniz’s main shareholders (BP and Statoil, both 
owning 25.5 percent) favor solutions different from Nabucco (importantly, 
Statoil owns 42.5 percent of TAP), instead preferring scalable, cost-effective 
pipelines, just suited to take over Shah Deniz’s 10 bcma as of 2017, leaves space 
place for a future trans-Caspian pipeline. Thus, they effectively downgrade the 
Southern Corridor’s capacity, and thereby its level of contribution to Europe’s 
energy security.  
 While we are still trying to assess Nabucco’s odds, others did form 
strong convictions some while ago. Petroleum Economist (2011) underscores 
Nabucco’s uncertain gas supplies (given the political complications of tapping 
into Turkmenistan reserves, and the political risk of investing in Iraq’s 
Kurdistan) and the uncertainties downstream, on the European markets (given 
the recent LNG glut in Western Europe and the newly factored potential of the 
so-called shale gas). Then, as indicated by Brueggmann (2011), quite a few 
experts and pundits took RWE’s mentioned deal with Gazprom this past 
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summer as a watershed moment: when such an important Nabucco shareholder 
as RWE joins forces with the Southern Corridor’s main competitor, little 
political and business impetus remains for Nabucco to be implemented. To 
better understand why this is the case, we ought to discuss about Nabucco’s 
true nemesis: South Stream.  
 
 
1.2 The non-Southern Corridor competitor: South Stream 
 
South Stream AG is a joint venture of OAO Gazprom (50%), Italian 
company Eni SpA (20%), German Wintershall (15%) and Electricité de France 
(15%). It is a mammoth project whose central piece would be a 900 km-long 
pipeline on the Black Sea’s seabed, linking Russia to Bulgaria. From there it 
would branch out in two onshore routes: a northwestern branch running from 
Bulgaria to Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia and Austria, and a southwestern one, 
going to Greece and then southern Italy, via a marine interconnector. However, 
the precise “geography” of these routes kept vacillating along with the political 
shifts upsetting the project’s feasibility. 
Technically- and financially-wise, South Stream is a hugely difficult 
venture. The planned volume was boosted from an initial 31 bcma to no less 
than 63 bcma (dpa, 2009) at a prohibiting initial cost of €24 billion, according to 
Gazprom’s own estimate – later revised downwards to €15.5 
(www.gazprom.com, 2010). According to the project’s website  (http://south-
stream.info), South Stream is “aimed at strengthening European energy 
security” by eliminating “transit risk”, as “another real step toward executing 
the Gazprom strategy to diversify the Russian natural gas supply routes” 
(Euractiv, 2011a). This, however, is not only unlikely, but also ironic. South 
Stream seems in fact to serve a different set of objectives: 
(1) To discourage Nabucco’s progress. Although the South Stream 
consortium’s official stance is that “South Stream and Nabucco are not 
competitors. Both projects will play a significant role in supplying natural 
gas to European consumers” (south-stream.info, 2011), it stands to 
reason that Gazprom’s primary concern is not to lose any market in 
Europe. Given Russia’s declining gas output and diminishing access to 
the Caspian states’ reserves, Gazprom would be better off if no pipeline 
at all connected the Caspian Basin to world markets – or, at least, no 
large scale, strategic pipeline;  
(2) To serve as a lever of coercion against Ukraine in potential future gas 
spats, such as those of 2006 and 2009. Indeed, in 2007 the main public 
argument for the construction of South Stream was the need to bypass 
the “unreliable” Ukraine. At present, Ukraine’s sidestepping has been in 
part been already accomplished, with the completion of Nord Stream’s 
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first leg. However, doing the same on Ukraine’s southern flank is 
nowadays both economically unrealistic and politically unnecessary.  
After President Yanukovych’s 2010 election, a merger formula between 
Gazprom and Naftogaz has been under negotiation – although Kiev’s decision-
makers and business circles fully realize that the country’s autonomy is at stake. 
Importantly, the economic viability of Ukraine’s heavy petrochemical and steel 
industry crucially depends on abundant and cheap natural gas from Russia. 
Kiev has advanced the notion of offering Gazprom a substantive share in the 
Ukraine’s gas transit system in a would-be Ukrainian-Russian-European 
consortium, in return for a price-cut in its massive gas imports. With the April 
21, 2010 barter agreement signed by Presidents Yanukovych and Medvedev in 
Kharkov, Ukraine agreed to extend the lease of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in 
Sevastopol (Crimea) for 25 years after 2017 (plus an automatic extension of five 
years) in exchange for a 30 percent price cut for the next ten years – a discount 
estimated to amount to $40 billion (Felgenhauer, 2010). Thereafter, since the 
agreement reached in 2009 with Gazprom by Yulia Tymoshenko (a deal that 
brought her in jail, almost three years later) was on the way to have Ukraine pay 
market prices starting January 2012, Kiev restarted negotiations with Moscow 
in the desperate need of keeping the price level under $400 per thousand cubic 
meters. Again, the negotiations included substantive political elements. At stake 
were not only the ownership over Ukraine’s pipelines and storage system, but 
also its interest in concluding association and free trade agreements with the 
European Union, and Russia’s counter-pressure that Kiev join the 2010 created 
Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus customs union. As late as November 10, 2011, 
a new gas deal between Russia and Ukraine seems to be almost sealed (Stratfor, 
2011). At we were writing this paper, the content of this agreement was not 
publicly known. It is though certain that a substantive political trade-off will 
take place. 
 Gazprom’s political tactics related to South Stream has been to divert 
political support away from Nabucco. One by one, the Nabucco consortium’s 
government and leading companies did also join South Stream. Romania was 
among the last ones to cave in, but it did eventually in the summer of 2010, 
when Bulgarian Prime Minister, Boyko Borisov, expressed public doubts about 
South Stream’s viability (Socor, 2010b). Romania jumped in and accepted 
Gazprom’s offer to become the project partner on the Western shores of the 
Black Sea. On June 16, 2010 the Romanian energy minister Adriean Videanu 
discussed in Moscow with Gazprom’s CEO, Alexei Miller, the sequence of 
steps needed to bring Romania into the South Stream undertaking. Eventually, 
though, after a series of politico-diplomatic moves, Sofia did sign on November 
13, 2010 an agreement with Gazprom regarding the creation of South Stream 
Bulgaria, a fifty-fifty joint venture. On the occasion, Gazprom’s CEO Alexei 
Miller emphasized that “Bulgaria can no longer be replaced by Romania as the 
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European hub of the Russian-sponsored South Stream gas transit pipeline 
(Novinite, 2010).  
Nonetheless, apart from its political success, South Stream has made 
little convincing progress in its own terms. A telling move was the demand by 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to energy minister Sergei Shmatko, on March 9, 
2011, to consider replacing South Stream’s offshore section with an LNG 
project that would transport liquefied gas from the Russian Black Sea coast to 
Bulgaria. This certainly adds to the skepticism that has all along accompanied 
Gazprom’s commitment to such an exorbitant undertaking. But is also achieves 
several political advances in one shot: first, it downsizes considerably the 
projected capacity from 63 to just 12 bcma – the average size of a large LNG 
facility. Second, it has managed to create confusion around the LNG-based 
AGRI, entering in direct competition to it. As hinted upon previously, it is 
doubtful that the Black Sea Basin has the scale to support commercially and 
financially one costly LNG project, let alone two at the same time. 
 
 
2. Conclusion 
 
The discussed gas pipeline projects play a defining role in the current 
energy security environment of the Black Sea Region. In effect, as emphasized 
by Dubien and Vaquer I Fanes (2010: 4), “the race for control over the south-
eastern route of gas supply into Europe” is truly one of the “main drivers of 
change in the Black Sea security environment”. Energy politics is a key factor in 
Moscow’s foreign policy. Importantly, it is not only aimed at securing demand 
for Russia’s most valuable exports; it also addresses Moscow’s goal to achieve 
political and economic control of a number of strategically important states in 
its vicinity.  
Against this background, the various interests and perceptions of the 
EU Member States in energy matters have led to a ‘collectively dissociated’ 
energy policy. The European Commission’s political initiatives of 2011 to 
achieve a unified diplomatic stance in dealing with the EU’s energy providers, 
to commit substantive financial support in order to leverage badly needed 
private investments into energy projects, but also to streamline and speed up 
the planning and approval processes for energy infrastructure is a significant 
step forward. Indeed, political changes in Brussels’ energy policies were needed 
with respect to the internal energy markets – i.e., incentives supplementary to 
the injunctions of the Third Energy Package – and its largely dysfunctional 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) – essentially due to a year-long over-supply of 
permits. But to the point of our discussion, the EC’s security of supplies 
policies in the Black Sea Region, surrounding the Southern Gas Corridor, may 
well have come too late to make a sizeable difference in the access to Caspian 
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gas. The market forces at work within SOCAR’s current tender for the Shah 
Deniz 2 production will most likely select a smaller-scale, adjustable 
interconnector, which will likely cut off the Turkmen gas from a westward 
transport corridor. As the regional landscape now present itself, Moscow seems 
to have won a politico-economic battle in competition in which it has along had 
high stakes. 
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